Game-theoretic infrastructure sharing in multioperator cellular networks by Bousia, Alexandra et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY 1
Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in
Multi-Operator Cellular Networks
Alexandra Bousia, Student Member, IEEE, Elli Kartsakli, Member, IEEE, Angelos Antonopoulos, Member, IEEE,
Luis Alonso, Senior Member, IEEE, and Christos Verikoukis, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The introduction of 4th Generation (4G) wireless
technologies has fueled the rapid development of cellular net-
works, significantly increasing the energy consumption and the
expenditures of the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). In
addition, the network underutilization during low traffic periods
(e.g., night zone) has motivated a new business model, namely
infrastructure sharing, that allows the MNOs to have their
traffic served by other MNOs in the same geographic area,
thus being able to switch off part of their network. In this
paper, we propose a novel infrastructure sharing algorithm for
multi-operator environments, which enables the deactivation of
underutilized Base Stations (BSs) during low traffic periods.
Motivated by the conflicting interests of the MNOs and the
necessity for effective solutions, we introduce a game theoretic
framework that enables the MNOs to individually estimate the
switching off probabilities that reduce their expected financial
cost. Our approach reaches a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
(DSE), which is the strategy that minimizes the cost of each
player. Finally, we provide extensive analytical and experimental
results to estimate the potential energy and cost savings that
can be achieved in multi-operator environments, incentivizing
the MNOs to apply the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Infrastructure sharing, Switching off, Base sta-
tion sleep, Game theory, Energy efficiency
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of mobile services, along with the
emerging demand for multimedia applications, driven by the
widespread use of laptops, tablets and smart devices, has led
to an impressive growth of the data traffic volume during the
last few years. According to recent market predictions [1],
global mobile data traffic is expected to increase nearly 11-
fold in the next five years, reaching 15.9 exabytes per month
by 2018. Hence, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs1) seek
to extend their infrastructure by installing more Base Stations
(BSs), in an effort to increase the capacity of their network
and meet these pressing traffic demands.
The additional infrastructure not only implies a rise in the
Capital Expenditures (CapEx), but also has a direct impact
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1Hereafter, the terms “MNO” and “operator” will be used interchangeably.
on the network energy consumption, thus resulting in higher
Operational Expenditures (OpEx) [2]. In particular, the use
of information and communication technology across a wide
range of applications accounts for 5.7% of the world’s elec-
tricity consumption and 1.8% of global carbon emissions [3],
something that translates into electricity bills in the order of
$10 billion for the MNOs worldwide [4]. Hence, there is
a strong motivation to investigate solutions to bring down
the energy consumption and the cost of cellular networks,
thus yielding both environmental and financial gains. Given
that cellular networks are dimensioned according to peak-hour
traffic demands, an effective approach towards this direction
is to temporarily switch off part of the BS infrastructure that
remains underutilized when the network traffic is low.
The coexistence of multiple MNOs in the same geographical
area [5], due to legal regulations that obligate them to install
their antennas on the same buildings, has motivated a new
business model, known as infrastructure sharing [6], [7]. This
new paradigm embraces a set of strategies that enable the
MNOs to use their resources jointly to reach their common
goal, which is to guarantee user service while achieving energy
and cost reduction. Infrastructure sharing is classified into
three categories [8]: i) passive sharing of sites, masts and
building premises, ii) active sharing of the active network com-
ponents such as antennas, switches and backhaul equipment,
and iii) roaming-based sharing, where the MNOs share the
cell coverage for a pre-negotiated time period.
In this paper, motivated by the aforementioned issues,
we propose a roaming-based infrastructure sharing scheme,
applicable in multi-operator environments during low traffic
periods. Taking into account the rationality of the MNOs
and their conflicting interests, we introduce a game theo-
retic framework that enables the MNOs to make individual
switching off decisions for their own BSs, thus bypassing
potential complicated service level agreements among them.
Besides the expected energy efficiency benefits, the proposed
scheme allows the MNOs to significantly reduce their financial
costs independently of the strategies of the coexisting MNOs,
providing them with the incentives to participate in the game.
Our contribution is summarized as follows:
1) As a part of an integrated roaming-based infrastructure
sharing scheme for multi-operator environments, we in-
troduce a game theoretic switching off algorithm that
aims at minimizing the individual MNO cost in a dis-
tributed manner. We define a realistic cost function that
explicitly considers actual roaming and operational costs
for the MNOs. We show that, in the proposed game, a
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Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE) can be reached,
defined as the strategy yielding the minimum cost for
each MNO, regardless of the other MNOs’ actions.
2) To address the heterogeneous nature of voice and data
traffic in current and future cellular networks, we design
an analytical model, based on a two-dimensional Markov
chain, that theoretically estimates the throughput, the
energy efficiency and the cost expenses both for the
individual MNOs and the whole network.
3) We validate the theoretical analysis and assess the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed infrastructure sharing scheme
with the aid of extensive simulation experiments. We in-
troduce a new performance metric, namely cost efficiency,
that connects the network performance with the financial
benefits of the MNOs. The results indicate the potential
total energy efficiency gains in the network and highlight
the individual cost and energy gains for the MNOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II briefly reviews the related work. The system model,
the network configuration and the notation used throughout
the paper are described in Section III. In Section IV, we
introduce the infrastructure sharing scheme, along with the
game formulation of the switching off decision. In Section V,
we present the analytical models for the energy efficiency, the
network throughput and the cost metrics. The validation of the
model and an extensive performance assessment are provided
in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the BS is one of the most power hungry network com-
ponents, several research works have focused on reducing the
number of BSs through optimal [9], [10] or heterogeneous de-
ployment strategies [11], [12]. Recently, in an effort to achieve
more drastic energy saving gains, the research community has
shifted towards the investigation of BS switching off schemes
[13]-[17]. The core idea is to increase resource utilization
during periods of low traffic (e.g., night) by switching off part
of the BS infrastructure, while the remaining active BSs extend
their coverage to serve the whole network area.
These traditional switching off schemes can be taken one
step further by considering the emerging business model of in-
frastructure sharing among multiple MNOs offering service to
the same geographical area. In particular, significant research
attention has been placed on roaming-based infrastructure
sharing solutions that consider joint BS switching off among
multiple MNOs [18]-[22]. In [18], a non-cooperative game
for switching off BSs in a two MNOs network is presented.
In their pioneer work, Marsan and Meo [19] proposed four
cooperative strategies to switch off BSs in networks with two
MNOs, according to the following criteria: i) equal switching
off time periods, ii) equal roaming costs, iii) equal energy
gains, iv) maximum energy savings. In all cases, the traffic
of the switched off BS is roamed to the collocated BS of the
active MNO. In [20], the authors extend the algorithm that
maximizes the energy savings (proposed in [19]) for multi-
operator environments with various traffic types and Quality
of Service (QoS) requirements (i.e., throughput, lost calls). In
the same context, Oh et al. [21] studied the potential energy
savings that can be achieved by opportunistically switching off
part of the network during low traffic in real-world scenarios.
In our former work [22], we introduced a game theoretic
switching off strategy in networks with two MNOs, providing
analytical expressions for the throughput and energy efficiency
calculation, assuming only one type of traffic (i.e., voice).
Nonetheless, despite their novel insights in the infrastructure
sharing concept, the aforementioned works study only partic-
ular aspects of the problem (e.g., switching off time, roaming
cost, energy savings). However, to provide feasible and effi-
cient solutions, it is necessary to take into consideration all
the important parameters (i.e., roaming and operational cost,
energy consumption, QoS in terms of lost calls). In addition,
the consideration of only voice traffic in some works (e.g.,
[19], [20]) is not realistic, since data traffic forms a significant
part of the total traffic load in current cellular networks.
Last but not least, the assumption of only two MNOs in the
network is a limiting factor for the contribution of the above
works, as the most common scenarios in European countries
involve three to four MNOs [5]. In the following sections, we
propose a distributed BS switching off solution that enables
the efficient infrastructure sharing in multi-operator networks,
taking into account realistic cost and traffic patterns.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model and Operation
Our system model, depicted in Fig. 1(a), considers clusters
of multi-operator cells. Each cluster is formed by one central
cell surrounded by M peripheral cells, while each cell includes
N BSs of different MNOs. Therefore, the term BSn,m is used
to denote the BS of the nth operator in the mth macro cell,
with n ∈ [1, N ] and m ∈ [0,M ]. Part of the BS infrastructure
in the M surrounding cells may be switched off during low
traffic conditions, motivating the MNOs to share the resources
of the remaining active BSs in the same cell. In contrast,
the central cell BSs always remain active and increase their
transmission power to form an umbrella cell, in the extreme
case where all the BSs of a peripheral cell are switched off.
Regarding the traffic model, we adopt a realistic pattern
[23]-[24] for the aggregate voice and data traffic per operator
in a given cell during the night zone. As depicted in the
leftmost part of Fig. 1(b), the maximum traffic per hour is
expressed as a percentage of the total BS capacity BW that
is considered same for all cells. We focus on the time zone
between 01.00 and 09.00 am2, when the total traffic per BS
is relatively low (i.e., less than 20% of the cell’s capacity).
For the sake of generality, we assume that the traffic of
different operators follows the same pattern but may vary
in volume. Hence, we define the percentage of each MNO’s
traffic load ρn ∈ [0, 1] with respect to the maximum traffic for
the respective hour. In the example depicted in the rightmost
part of Fig. 1(b), the traffic of three MNOs is considered. The
first MNO has the maximum traffic volume (i.e., ρ1 = 1),
whereas the second and the third MNO have 70% and 30%
(i.e., ρ2 = 0.7 and ρ3 = 0.3) of the maximum traffic,
2Our algorithm can be adapted to different traffic conditions and the
selection of the night zone may vary according to the actual traffic variations.
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Fig. 1. Scenario and traffic model
respectively. Finally, the voice and data connections are served
at a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) of RV and RD, respectively3.
B. Notation
Before proceeding to the algorithm description, let us define
the next sets:
• M = {1, . . . ,M}, with |M| = M , is the set of
peripheral cells forming a cluster around a central cell.
• N = {1, . . . , N}, with |N | = N , is the set of N
operators covering the cluster area.
• MON ⊆ M, with |MON | = MON , is the subset of
peripheral cells with at least one active BS.
• MOFF ⊆M, with |MOFF | = MOFF , is the subset of
peripheral cells with all BSs switched off.
• N (m)ON ⊆ N , with
∣∣∣N (m)ON ∣∣∣ = N (m)ON , is the subset of MNOs
that maintain their BSs active in cell m.
• N (m)OFF ⊆ N , with
∣∣∣N (m)OFF ∣∣∣ = N (m)OFF , is the subset of
MNOs that switch off their BSs in cell m.
• N (n,m)roam ⊆ N (m)OFF , with
∣∣∣N (n,m)roam ∣∣∣ = N (n,m)roam , is the subset
of operators that select operator n in order to roam the
traffic of their switched off BS in cell m.
IV. INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING WITH GAME THEORETIC
SWITCHING OFF DECISION
In this section, we introduce the infrastructure sharing
framework for multi-operator environments, consisting of two
3We consider that no rate adaptation takes place within the cell and all
users of a given service class are allocated the same amount of resources,
calculated for cell edge users. Although this is the worst case scenario, our
approach is suitable for our high-level study, while the optimized resource
allocation (i.e., spectral efficiency) is not so critical during the night zone.
parts: i) an infrastructure sharing algorithm and ii) a game
theoretic switching off decision strategy. The infrastructure
sharing algorithm that defines the rules for the collaboration
among the MNOs, given that part of the BS infrastructure
is switched off during the night zone is presented in Sec-
tion IV-A. Then, in Section IV-B, we formulate the BS
switching off decision as a game theoretic strategy that enables
each operator to determine the best course of action in each
cell, in order to reduce its own cost and energy consumption.
A. Infrastructure Sharing Scheme
Let us recall that the considered system model (Sec-
tion III-A) includes N MNOs that provide coverage to a
cluster of one central and M peripheral cells. For the low-
traffic night zone, a subset of each operator’s BSs in the periph-
eral cells is switched off. Once this BS subset is determined
(through the game theoretic algorithm described in the next
section), the proposed infrastructure sharing scheme is applied
to determine how the traffic will be served by the remaining
active infrastructure, taking into account the corresponding
operation and roaming costs.
The proposed infrastructure sharing scheme is applied in the
network after the execution of the independent switching off
decisions. According to the outcome of the decision process,
there are three possible outcomes in a peripheral cell m:
1) If all the BSs remain active (i.e., N (m)ON = N ), no infras-
tructure sharing takes place. Hence, each BS consumes
energy for operation and service of its own traffic.
2) If a subset N (m)ON ⊂ N of the BSs remains active, then
they undertake the service of the traffic of the switched off
BSs in the same cell (i.e., N (m)OFF ). In particular, the traffic
of each switched off BS is roamed to an active BS of the
same cell, selected randomly with equal probability ps
from the subset N (m)ON . The MNOs of the deactivated BSs
should pay the corresponding roaming cost to the active
operators. However, the increased energy consumption
(due to the higher traffic) of the active BSs implies a
higher cost that should also be considered.
3) If no BSs remain active, (i.e., N (m)ON = ∅), the BSs of the
central cell (BSn,0) increase their transmission power to
cover the area of the peripheral cell. In this case, there
is no collaboration between operators, since the traffic
of each switched off BS is served by the central BS of
the same operator. Hence, no roaming costs are involved,
while the operators take into account the extra cost for
the increased power consumption in the central cell.
Having defined the general network operation, each MNO is
able to make an individual switching off decision without the
need of exchanging information and, subsequently, to execute
the infrastructure sharing algorithm (Algorithm 1), illustrated
in Fig. 2. Given the aforementioned three possible outcomes
for the peripheral cell m, four different cases can be observed
from the point of view of the nth operator (i.e., MNOn):
• Case 1 - Operator n is ON and N (m)ON = N − 1
operators are ON: The total cost for the MNOn is
Cn,m = Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr , where Cconst represents the
fixed operational cost for the BS and C(n,m)tr corresponds
to the cost for serving the BS’s traffic.
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of the infrastructure sharing algorithm
• Case 2 - Operator n is ON and N (m)OFF > 0 operators
are OFF: In this case, MNOn may have to pay a higher
cost due to the increased served traffic (i.e., its own
traffic along with the roamed traffic of other BSs), while
receiving the corresponding roaming income from each
operator MNOi ∈ N (n,m)roam . More specifically:
– The total operation cost can be expressed as C
′
n,m =
Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr +
∑
i∈N (n,m)roam C
(i,m)
tr
– The received roaming income by MNOn can be
expressed as C
′(n,m)
roam =
∑
i∈N (n,m)roam C
(i,m)
roam, where
C
(i,m)
roam is the roaming cost paid by MNOi and can be
considered as a portion of the total operational cost,
i.e., C(n,m)roam = α ·
(
Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr
)
, with α ∈ [0, 1].
Consequently, in this case, the total cost for operator
MNOn can be written as:
Cn,m = Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr +
∑
i∈N (n,m)roam C
(i,m)
tr − α ·(
Cconst ·
∑
i∈N (n,m)roam C
(i,m)
tr
)
.
• Case 3 - Operator n is OFF and N (m)ON > 0 operators
are ON: In this case, operator n should pay the roaming
cost to one operator from the active set N (m)ON randomly
selected with equal probability ps = 1/N
(m)
ON . Hence, in
this case, Cn,m = C
(m,m)
roam .
• Case 4 - Operator n is OFF and N (m)OFF = N − 1
operators are OFF: In this case, the cost paid by the
MNOn corresponds to the extra energy consumption for
the power increase of the central BS (BSn,0), in order to
cover the area of a switched off BS in a peripheral cell.
Hence, Cn,m = C
(n,0)
inc .
B. Game Theoretic Switching Off Strategy
The proposed infrastructure sharing scheme defines the
rules of agreement among the MNOs, taking as an input the
subset of switched off BSs in the peripheral cells. Hence, the
individual switching off decisions constitute the core of the
proposed scheme and its main contribution. By considering
the conflicting interests and the interaction among the MNOs,
as well as the different available courses of action, we propose
a game theoretic BS switching off strategy. We model the
switching off decision process as a static non-cooperative
game with complete information [25], played by the N MNOs
in each of the M peripheral cells. Non-cooperative game
theory provides multi-fold advantages, enabling us:
• to model the aforementioned conflicting situations be-
tween the MNOs with high accuracy;
Algorithm 1 Infrastructure sharing algorithm of BSn,m in
peripheral cell m
Require: Switching off decision of all MNOs in cell m
1: for each m ∈M do
2: for each n ∈ N do
3: if
(
(n ∈ N (m)ON ) & (N (m)OFF = ∅)
)
then . Case 1
4: Cn,m = Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr
5: else if
(
(n ∈ N (m)ON ) & (N (m)OFF 6= ∅)
)
then .
Case 2
6: Cn,m = Cconst + C
(n,m)
tr
7: for each (r ∈ N (n,m)roam ) do
8: BSn,m
roam←−−− BSr,m
9: Cn,m = Cn,m + C
(n,m)
tr − C(n,m)roam
10: end for
11: else if
(
(n ∈ N (m)OFF ) & (N (m)ON 6= ∅)
)
then .
Case 3
12: Select operator r ∈ N (m)ON with probability
ps = 1/N
(m)
ON
13: BSn,m
roam−−−→ BSr,m
14: Cn,m = C
(n,m)
roam
15: else if
(
(n ∈ N (m)OFF ) & (N (m)ON = ∅)
)
then .
Case 4
16: BSn,m
roam−−−→ BSn,0
17: Cn,m = C
(n,0)
inc
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
• to minimize the exchange of information among the
different MNOs. This is very important, since, in compet-
itive environments, the MNOs may not be willing to dis-
close extensive network information to their competitors.
Furthermore, minimizing interactions can reduce the risk
of misbehavior, since selfish operators could choose to
modify their statistics to increase their personal benefits;
• to reach distributed close-to-optimal solutions for realistic
scenarios. In the proposed game, a DSE can be achieved,
which can be easily calculated with limited required
information. The DSE represents the solution where each
player’s assigned strategy minimizes its cost, regardless
of the other players’ strategy and, in our formulation, it
is very close to the Pareto optimal solution.
The remaining of this section is divided into three parts.
First, the game formulation and the cost matrix are given,
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followed by the individual cost minimization analysis in the
second part. Finally, the DSE of the game is discussed, along
with some numerical results on the switching off probabilities.
1) Game Formulation:
Definition 1. The non-cooperative game Γ can be represented
in strategic form by the triplet: Γ = (N ,Sn,m, Cn,m), with
n ∈ N ,m ∈M, where:
• N = {1, . . . , N} is the finite set of players corresponding
to the N operators.
• Sn,m = {ON,OFF} is the set of the two possible actions
for each MNOn with respect to the BSn,m, i.e., BSn,m
can be active (state ON) or switched off (state OFF).
• Cn,m : S → R+ is the cost function for player n in the
peripheral cell m, where S = S1,m× · · · ×Sn,m× · · · ×
SN,m represents the Cartesian product.
The cost function of the game Cn,m has been selected to
match the cost paid by each operator in every peripheral cell,
as described in Section IV-A. However, exploiting the fact that
the small traffic load variations during night have a negligible
impact on the operational cost of the BS, it can be assumed
that all operators have approximately the same cost for serving
the traffic in a given cell m, i.e., C(n,m)tr ≈ C(m)tr . Similarly,
the roaming cost, which is expressed as a function of the
operational cost, is also simplified to C(n,m)roam ≈ C(m)roam.
This realistic simplification has two direct implications on
the game formulation. First, the operators can accurately
calculate their cost function by using average traffic statistics
for a given cell. As a result, there is no need for information
exchange among MNOs (to obtain the actual traffic values)
prior to the application of the game, thus facilitating its im-
plementation and eliminating any concerns about truthfulness.
Second, by simplifying the cost functions, the MNOs obtain
the same payoffs for a given action and, as a result, the
outcome of the game is independent of the identity of the
players. Hence, by definition, the proposed game is symmetric,
allowing its formulation as an N -player game with 2 macro-
players: i) player A is a given MNOi, with i ∈ N ii) player
B is the set N \{i}, formed by the remaining N−1 operators,
excluding MNOi. The matrix representation of the game is
given in Table I, showing the costs of player A with respect
to the different contingencies of player B.
The costs in Table I correspond to the different cases
of the infrastructure sharing algorithm described in Section
IV-A, after applying the simplification mentioned above. The
formulation of our problem in a strategic form reveals one
pure strategy, corresponding to the case where the MNOs
switch off in all peripheral cells, thus minimizing the number
of active BSs. However, this strategy would require major
transmission power increase of the central BSs and could lead
to lost sessions, since the central cells may not have sufficient
capacity to support all the traffic of the cluster. This limitation
of the pure strategy, along with the motivation of the MNOs
to achieve energy efficiency without sacrificing ubiquitous
service in the network, have motivated us to study the problem
in the mixed strategies domain, in order to provide feasible
and applicable solutions for distributed systems. Therefore,
we proceed to a mixed strategy approach, where the MNOs
randomize over the possible actions with a certain probability
distribution. In the next section, we calculate the strategy that
minimizes the cost of each player, and, then, by exploiting the
symmetry of the game, we prove that a DSE is achieved.
2) Individual Cost Minimization Analysis:
The aim of the game is to calculate the set of the switching
off probabilities that minimizes the expected cost of MNOi,
∀i ∈ N , given by:
E[Ci,m] = E[CON,ONi,m ] + E[C
OFF,OFF
i,m ]
+ E[COFF,ONi,m ] + E[C
ON,OFF
i,m ].
(1)
To that end, we define as si,m the probability of player A
(i.e., MNOi) switching off the BSi,m. Furthermore, due to
the symmetry of the game, the remaining N − 1 operators are
grouped together into player B, having a common switching
off probability sj,m. Subsequently, the expected costs of player
A in each state of the game are estimated as follows:
1) Case 1 (ON,ON): The expected cost for MNO i is:
E[CON,ONi,m ] = (1− si,m)·(1− sj,m)N−1·
(
Cconst + C
(m)
tr
)
.
(2)
2) Case 2 (ON,OFF): Each of the N (m)OFF switched off BSs
randomly selects one of the N (m)ON active BSs of the same
cell m with equal probability ps = 1/N
(m)
ON . The random
decision does not affect the outcome of our approach,
since the roaming cost is indifferent to the BS selection.
Hence, the number of switched off BSs that will select
operator i to serve their traffic (N (i,m)roam) will determine its
actual cost. To calculate the expected cost, all the possible
roaming combinations that involve the ith operator must
be considered, leading to Eq. (3) (top of the next page).
3) Case 3 (OFF,ON): In this case, the traffic of the switched
off BSi,m is roamed to one active BS, with a cost:
E[COFF,ONi,m ] = si,m·
(
1− (1− sj,m)N−1
)
·C(m)roam. (4)
4) Case 4 (OFF,OFF): The BSs of all operators are switched
off and the traffic is served by the corresponding BSs of
the central cell, which increase their transmission power
to cover the peripheral cell, with an expected cost:
E[COFF,OFFi,m ] = si,m · sN−1j,m · C(i,0)inc . (5)
Substituting Eq. (2)-(5) to Eq. (1), we derive Eq. (6) at the
top of the next page.
Let us recall that the goal of each MNO is to estimate its
individual switching off probability that minimizes its cost. To
that end, the strategy that minimizes the cost of the ith MNO,
si,m, given the strategy sj,m is calculated by the roots of the
partial derivative of the cost function with respect to si,m:
∂E[Ci,m]
∂si,m
= 0⇒ sN−1j,m · C(i,0)inc +
(
1− (1− sj,m)N−1
)
·C(m)roam −
N∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− sj,m)N
(m)
ON −1 · sN−N
(m)
ON
j,m
·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
]
= 0. (7)
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TABLE I
COST MATRIX OF THE PROPOSED GAME
Player B: N − 1 operators in N \ {i}
ON OFF
Player A:
Operator i
ON Cconst + C
(m)
tr Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
·N(i,m)roam
OFF C(m)roam C
(i,0)
inc
E[CON,OFFi,m ] =
N−1∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(1− si,m) ·
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− sj,m)N
(m)
ON −1 · sN−N
(m)
ON
j,m ·
[ N−N(m)ON∑
N
(i,m)
roam=0
(
N −N (m)ON
N
(i,m)
roam
)
· pN(i,m)roams
· (1− ps)(N−N
(m)
ON −N(i,m)roam) ·
(
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
·N (i,m)roam
)]
=
N−1∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(1− si,m) ·
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− sj,m)N
(m)
ON −1 · sN−N
(m)
ON
j,m ·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
]
.
(3)
E[Ci,m] = si,m · sN−1j,m · C(i,0)inc + si,m ·
(
1− (1− sj,m)N−1
)
· C(m)roam +
N∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(1− si,m) ·
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− sj,m)N
(m)
ON −1 · sN−N
(m)
ON
j,m ·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
]
.
(6)
Having provided the analysis for the individual cost min-
imization strategy, in the following section, we exploit the
symmetry of the game to prove that the estimated value for
the sj,m corresponds to the DSE.
3) DSE Characterization and Numerical Results:
According to [26, Definition 3.4]:
Definition 2. A strategy profile s∗ = {s∗1 . . . s∗n} ∈ S is the
DSE if each element s∗i of s∗ is dominant strategy of player i.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the game Γ is a DSE and
is calculated by Eq. (8) at the top of the next page.
The proof of the Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. The DSE of the game Γ is unique.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B.
Unlike other widely-employed game theoretic concepts
(e.g., Nash Equilibrium) that may require a number of it-
erations before converging to an acceptable solution [27]-
[29], DSE can be always achieved in one shot. This is
very important in our case where multiple iterations cannot
be implemented, given that the continuous interchangeable
switching on and off of the macro BSs is not considered as a
viable option by the mobile operators [26], [30]. However, our
practical and realistic game formulation enables the MNOs to
reach the DSE by estimating one-shot switching off probabil-
ities, which is particularly important in our problem. Hence,
instead of applying an iterative algorithm that follows the best
response dynamics to converge to an equilibrium, we show that
one MNO can estimate the switching off strategies by knowing
only the total number of operators (N ) in the network.
Having derived the theoretical expression for the mixed
strategies DSE, we study the impact of the number of MNOs
and the roaming cost parameter α on the switching off prob-
abilities through some numerical results, presented in Table
II. The cost values are calculated based on the average traffic
volume, given the Fig. 1(b). We consider values from N = 2
up to N = 6 operators, while we assume five different values
for α (α = 0.1, α = 0.3, α = 0.5, α = 0.7 and α = 0.9) with
respect to the definition of roaming cost in Section IV-A.
TABLE II
DSE SWITCHING OFF PROBABILITIES
N a = 0.1 a = 0.3 a = 0.5 a = 0.7 a = 0.9
2 0.459 0.377 0.296 0.215 0.133
3 0.679 0.629 0.568 0.486 0.357
4 0.799 0.749 0.675 0.584 0.466
5 0.854 0.826 0.795 0.758 0.713
6 0.880 0.861 0.843 0.819 0.798
Two main conclusions can be derived from Table II. First,
the DSE switching off probabilities increase with the number
of MNOs in each cell. In particular, the coexistence of many
operators in one cell motivates a given MNO to switch
off its BS, as it implies a higher probability of having its
traffic roamed to a different MNO. Regarding the second
basic observation, as expected, the switching off probability
decreases for higher roaming cost, which is a prohibitive factor
for the BS deactivation. However, it is worth noting that the
DSE probability is severely reduced for higher roaming in
networks with few MNOs, due to the risk of switching off all
BSs in the cell. On the other hand, in a network with many
MNOs, where the aforementioned risk is not so evident, the
switching off probability for high a is still significant. Finally,
in Appendix C, we compare the DSE to the global optimal
solution to provide further insights for our game formulation.
V. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, we provide analytical models for the calcu-
lation of the network throughput, energy efficiency and cost.
As mentioned in Section III-A, the network traffic consists
of voice and data, with CBRs RV and RD, respectively. We
assume that for each BSn,m, voice calls and data sessions
are Poisson generated processes with rates λ(n,m)V and λ
(n,m)
D
and have exponential service times, denoted by 1/µ(n,m)V and
1/µ
(n,m)
D , respectively. Hence, we model the operation of
BSn,m as a multi-server M1,M2/G1, G2/N/N1, N2 queue,
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s∗
N−1 · C(i,0)inc +
(
1− (1− s∗)N−1
)
· C(m)roam
−
N∑
N
(m)
ON
=1
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− s∗)N
(m)
ON
−1 · s∗N−N(m)ON ·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
]
= 0
(8)
resulting in a two-dimensional Markov chain, illustrated in
Fig. 3. Each state of the system (ν, d) is characterized by the
number of active voice and data sessions, denoted by ν and
d, respectively. The state space of this Markov model, along
with the bandwidth restrictions, is:
A = { (ν, d) |0 ≤ ν ≤ NV ,
0 ≤ d ≤ ND, ν ·RV + d ·RD ≤ BW}, (9)
given that BW is the total bandwidth of the BS, NV =
BW/RV and ND = BW/RD represent the maximum number
of simultaneous voice calls and data sessions, respectively.
v,d
v,d+1
v-1,d
Fig. 3. Two-dimensional Markov state transition diagram for the voice
and data traffic served in a BS (Note that for convenience, MNO and cell
identification notations have been dropped.)
By analyzing the state transition diagram (Fig. 3), we obtain
the system of linear equations for steady state probabilities,
p(ν,d). The balance equation that represents the valid transi-
tions is given by Eq. (10) at the top of the next page.
The steady state probabilities are calculated given the con-
dition that the sum of the state probabilities is equal to 1,
i.e.,
NV∑
ν=0
bBW−ν·RVRD c∑
d=0
p(ν,d) = 1. Employing the steady state
probabilities, we calculate some key performance metrics for
the individual BSs and the whole network.
A. Operator-wide performance metrics
In this section, we analyze the performance of a BSn,m
with total bandwidth of BW , belonging to operator n in a
given cell m. We focus on the night zone, with duration tnight,
when voice and data sessions have an average generation rate
of λ(n,m)V and λ
(n,m)
D , respectively.
1) Definition 3. Cell Throughput: The expected throughput
E [Tn,m] for the BSn,m is defined as the average number (over
all possible states) of served sessions in the system multiplied
by the transmission rate of each session (i.e., RV and RD for
voice and data, respectively) and calculated as:
E [Tn,m] =
NV∑
ν=0
bBW−ν·RVRD c∑
d=0
(ν ·RV + d ·RD) · p(ν,d), (13)
where p(ν,d) are the steady state probabilities for the given
traffic load rates λ(n,m)V and λ
(n,m)
D .
A very important and relevant metric in our work is the
normalized throughput, defined as the ratio of the served
connections to the total existing connections in the network.
This metric is often employed to represent the Grade of
Service (GoS) in telecommunication systems, showing the
level of user satisfaction in the system. Achieving a normalized
throughput of 100% signifies that all users are served, which
is a key requirement for MNOs.
2) Definition 4. Cell Energy Efficiency: The expected en-
ergy efficiency E[η(n,m) ] for BSn,m is defined as the ratio of
the average transmitted bits E [Bn,m] over the average energy
consumption E [En,m]:
E[η(n,m) ] =
E [Bn,m]
E [En,m]
, (14)
where E [Bn,m] can be calculated by multiplying the average
throughput (Eq. (13)) with the duration of the night zone
(tnight), i.e., E [Bn,m] = E [Tn,m] · tnight.
To calculate the average energy consumption, we consider
the power consumed by the BS for operation and transmission,
consisting of three components: i) the constant power Pconst,
consumed by an active BS for operations such as cooling,
antenna feeding, etc, ii) the idle power Pidle, which is the
power consumed when the BS remains idle, i.e., when it has
no ongoing traffic sessions4, and iii) the transmission power for
serving the ongoing traffic sessions corresponding to each state
p(ν,d), considering that Ptx denotes the transmission power
for serving a single voice or data session. Hence, the average
energy consumption during the night zone tnight is given by:
E [En,m] =
(
Pconst + Pidle · p(0,0) +
NV∑
ν=0
bBW−ν·RVRD c∑
d=0
(ν + d) · Ptx · p(ν,d)
)
· tnight.
(15)
3) Cost: We provide analytical expressions for the different
terms (i.e., Cconst, C
(n,m)
tr , C
(n,0)
inc , C
(n,m)
roam ) that compose Eq.
(6), which provides the expected cost for an MNO.
First, Cconst, C
(n,m)
tr and C
(n,0)
inc refer to the costs related to
the operation of an active BS and the service of the existing
traffic. These costs depend directly on the energy consumed
for the different functions of the BSs. Therefore, provided that
c1 is the electricity charge per energy unit, in [e/kWh], the
operational costs of a BS can be expressed as a function of
the average energy consumption [31]. Thus, we have:
Cconst = c1 · Pconst · tnight, (16)
C
(n,m)
tr = c1 ·
(
Pidle · p(0,0) +
NV∑
ν=0
bBW−ν·RVRD c∑
d=0
(ν + d) · Ptx · p(ν,d)
)
· tnight,
(17)
4The fraction of time that the BS remains idle is expressed by the
probability p(0,0) in the Markov chain (Fig. 3).
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p(ν,d) ·
(
λ
(n,m)
V · ϕν+1,d + λ(n,m)D · ϕν,d+1 · ϑν,d+1 + ν · µ(n,m)V · ϕν−1,d + d · µ(n,m)D · ϕν,d−1
)
= λ
(n,m)
V · p(ν−1,d) · ϕν−1,d
+ λ
(n,m)
D · p(ν,d−1) · ϕν,d−1 · ϑν,d + (ν + 1) · µ(n,m)V · p(ν+1,d) · ϕν+1,d + (d+ 1) · µ(n,m)D · p(ν,d+1) · ϕν,d+1, (10)
where ϕν,d, ϑν,d denote the characteristic functions:
ϕν,d =
{
1, (ν, d) ∈ A,
0, otherwise.
(11) ϑν,d =
{
1, ν ·RV + d ·RD ≤ BW ,
0, otherwise.
(12)
C
(n,0)
inc = c1 ·
(
P ′idle · p(0,0) +
NV∑
ν=0
bBW−ν·RVRD c∑
d=0
(ν + d) · P ′tx · p(ν,d)
)
· tnight,
(18)
where P ′idle and P
′
tx denote the power consumed when the BS
remains idle and the transmission power for serving a single
voice or data session, when the central BS increases its power.
With regard to the roaming cost, C(n,m)roam corresponds to the
amount paid when an operator roams its traffic to the BSs of
another operator. In Section IV-A, the definition of the roaming
cost with respect to Cconst and C
(n,m)
tr was given. Now, this
definition is extended by considering the operational electricity
charges. Based on the energy consumption of a BS, E [En,m],
the roaming cost is given by:
C(n,m)roam = α · c1 · E [En,m] . (19)
4) Cost efficiency: Having defined theoretical expressions
for the network performance and cost, we introduce a novel
metric, named cost efficiency, that connects the performance
with the total cost for each operator.
Definition 5. Cell Cost Efficiency, measured in [Mbits/e],
is defined as the ratio of the average transmitted bits over the
operator’s total expenses. Accordingly, the cost efficiency of
an operator n in a peripheral cell m is expresses as:
E [ηn,mc ] =
E [Bn,m]
E[Cn,m]
. (20)
B. Network-wide performance metrics
In continuation, we calculate the respective metrics for
the network of N operators in a cluster of one central and
M peripheral cells. Based on the game theoretic analysis
(Section IV-B), each operator n may choose to switch off the
BS of a peripheral cell m with a switching off probability s∗.
As explained before, depending on the case, the traffic of each
switched off BS is served either by the central BS of the same
operator, or by a different operator of the same cell.
To calculate the global performance metrics of the network,
we calculate the average traffic load that is served by each BS
after the application of the infrastructure sharing algorithm. We
define as λ
′(n,m)
T , T = {V,D} the new average traffic load of
the BSn,m for voice and data traffic, which is equal to the
traffic λ(n,m)T of the nth MNO plus any additional roamed
traffic. We distinguish the following two cases:
• For each BSn,0 of the central cell:
λ
′(n,0)
T = λ
(n,0)
T +
∑
i∈MOFF
λ
(n,i)
T . (21)
• For each BSn,m of the peripheral cells (m ∈ [1,M ]) that
remains active and roams the traffic of N (n,m)roam MNOs:
λ
′(n,m)
T = λ
(n,m)
T +
∑
i∈N (n,m)roam
λ
(i,m)
T . (22)
Using these values for the traffic load, the steady state prob-
abilities p′(ν,d) for each BS are recalculated and employed for
the estimation of the key network metrics, explained below.
1) Definition 6. Total Network Throughput: The total
throughput of the cluster, E [T ], is the sum of the average
throughputs of the active BSs in the M peripheral cells and
the central cell (which always remains active):
E [T ] =
M∑
MOFF=0
(
M
MOFF
)
· s∗N·MOFF ·
(
1− s∗N
)(M−MOFF )
·
N−1∑
N
(m)
OFF=0
(
N
N
(m)
OFF
)
· s∗N
(m)
OFF · (1− s∗)N−N
(m)
OFF (23)
·
( ∑
m∈MON
∑
n∈N (m)ON
(
E
[
T ′n,m
])
+
∑
n∈N
·E [T ′n,0]),
where E[T ′n,m] is the average throughput of an active BSn,m
in cell m, calculated by Eq. (13) using the corresponding traf-
fic load (Eq. (22)). Similarly, E[T ′n,0] is the average throughput
of the central BSs, with average traffic load given by Eq. (21).
2) Definition 7. Total Network Energy Efficiency: The total
energy efficiency E [η] in the cell cluster is calculated as the
total number of transmitted bits E[B] divided by the total
energy consumption E[E]:
E [η] =
M∑
MOFF=0
(
M
MOFF
)
· s∗N·MOFF
·
(
1− s∗N
)(M−MOFF ) · E[B]
E[E]
.
(24)
Similarly to Eq. (23), E[B] is calculated as:
E [B] =
N−1∑
N
(m)
OFF=0
(
N
N
(m)
OFF
)
· s∗N
(m)
OFF · (1− s∗)N−N
(m)
OFF ·
( ∑
m∈MON
∑
n∈N (m)ON
(
E
[
B′n,m
])
+
∑
n∈N
·E [B′n,0]), (25)
where E[B′n,m] and E[B′n,0] the average transmitted bits for
the BSs of the peripheral and the central cells, respectively,
calculated for the corresponding traffic (Eq. (22) and (21)).
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Accordingly, the total energy consumption is derived as:
E [E] =
N−1∑
N
(m)
OFF=0
(
N
N
(m)
OFF
)
· s∗N
(m)
OFF · (1− s∗)N−N
(m)
OFF ·
( ∑
m∈MON
∑
n∈N (m)ON
(
E
[
E′n,m
])
+
∑
n∈N
·E [E′n,0]). (26)
3) Definition 8. Total Network Cost: The total cost of the
network, E[C], is the sum of the average cost of all operators
for the operation of their active BSs and for the service of the
existing traffic load, estimated as:
E[C] = E[E] · c1, (27)
where E[E] is calculated by Eq. (26) for the average traffic
served over a year. Apparently, the total network cost is not
affected by the roaming cost, which only specifies the amount
of money that is going to be exchanged among the operators.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We have developed a custom-made C++ simulator for the
network operation to validate the analytical expressions and
assess the performance of the proposed infrastructure sharing
scheme. In this section, we present the simulation setup along
with the analytical and experimental results.
A. Simulation scenario
The simulation scenario considers a 7-cell cluster with one
central and M = 6 peripheral cells. Each cell is served by N
BSs of different MNOs, as described in Section III-A and up
to N = 6 MNOs are considered in our experiments.
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare the
proposed Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing strategy (re-
ferred as GTIS hereafter) with three state-of-the-art approaches
[19], [20]: i) aRoaming-to-One scheme (R-to-1), where the
MNO with the highest traffic serves the total traffic in the
network, while the rest MNOs switch off their BSs during
the entire night zone, ii) a Roaming-to-All approach, namely
Energy-balanced (E-bal), where the MNOs switch off their
BSs for different portions of time to balance their energy
saving, and iii) a Roaming-to-All approach, namely Roaming-
balanced (R-bal), where the MNOs switch off their BSs for
different portions of time to balance their roaming costs. In
the Roaming-to-All strategies, the MNOs roam their traffic
to all the active networks with a probability proportional to
their network size. Moreover, we consider a baseline approach
(No Switch Off), where all BSs are active. The simulation
parameters are summarized in Table III.
B. Model Validation
In this section, we validate via extensive simulations the
analytical models for the network throughput, energy effi-
ciency and network cost for different traffic profiles, roaming
cost values and number of MNOs in each cell. In this set of
experiments, we assume that all operators have the same traffic
volume, i.e., ρn = ρ.
Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) present the total network throughput
performance for different traffic profiles and number of MNOs,
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Bandwidth, BW 115 Mbps
# of peripheral cells, M 6
# of operators, N {2,4,5,6}
Traffic load, Load Fig.1(b)
Traffic load ratio, ρn [0.1, 1.0]
Service rates, µV , µD Mean: 1/50 calls/s
Transmission rates, RV , RD 64, 256 kbps
Idle power, Pidle [0.34, 1.39] W
Transmission power, Ptx, P ′tx [1.29, 1.5] W
Constant power, Pconst [591, 675] W
Cell radius [500, 1500] m
Night zone duration, tnight 9 · 3600 s
Roaming cost variable, α [0.1, 1.0]
Electricity charge, c1 0.1 e/kWh
01.00 03.00 05.00 07.00 09.00
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Hour of day
N
e
tw
o
rk
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s
)
GTIS (sim.) ρ=0.9
GTIS (sim.) ρ=0.5
GTIS (sim.) ρ=0.1
Analytical Model
N = 4, α = 0.5
(a)
01.00 03.00 05.00 07.00 09.00
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Hour of day
N
e
tw
o
rk
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s
)
GTIS (sim.) N=2
GTIS (sim.) N=4
GTIS (sim.) N=6
Analytical Model
α = 0.5, ρ=0.9
(b)
Fig. 4. Total network throughput validation for different (a) traffic profiles,
(b) number of MNOs
respectively. As we can see, the experimental results perfectly
match the analysis, thus validating the proposed theoretical
expressions. In both figures, we observe that the throughput
presents similar behavior with the traffic load model (Section
III-A). As expected, the network throughput also increases
with the traffic load of each operator (ρ), as well as with the
number of MNOs in each cell (N ). It is worth mentioning that
the roaming cost does not affect the throughput performance
in the case of N = 4 MNOs, since there are no lost calls in
the network. For higher number of operators, there are missed
calls and this impact will be also studied in Section VI-D.
Figure 5 illustrates the total network energy efficiency
achieved by the proposed infrastructure sharing policy for
different traffic profiles (Fig. 5(a)), number of operators (Fig.
5(b)) and roaming cost values (Fig. 5(c)), which affect the
switching off probabilities and, consequently, the total energy
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Fig. 5. Total network energy efficiency validation for different (a) traffic profiles, (b) number of MNOs, and (c) roaming cost
efficiency. First, the analytical expressions given in Section
V are again validated, while we observe a very similar
behavior with the throughput case. More specifically, we
observe that the network energy efficiency increases as the
network becomes more loaded (i.e., for heavier traffic loads
or higher number of operators). Hence, the proposed algorithm
provides an effective energy efficient solution that encourages
the operators to share their infrastructure in order to reduce the
energy consumption. Furthermore, energy efficiency increases
as the roaming cost drops, since lower roaming costs lead to
increased switching off probabilities, as seen in Table II, thus
reducing the energy consumption of the network.
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Fig. 6. Average network energy efficiency validation for different number of
operators and different (a) traffic profiles, (b) roaming costs
In order to gain more insight on the network performance,
we have plotted the average network energy efficiency during
the night zone versus different traffic volumes (Fig. 6(a)) and
roaming cost values (Fig. 6(b)). In Fig. 6(a), we observe that
although the absolute value of the network energy efficiency
increases with the number of operators, the relative difference
ratio is independent of the traffic load. More specifically, in all
cases, a network of N = 6 operators is approximately 80% and
280% more energy efficient compared to networks of N = 4
and N = 2 operators, respectively. This interesting fact can be
explained by taking into account that the outcome of the game
theoretic algorithm (i.e., switching off probabilities) is not
affected by the traffic load variations. Referring to Table III,
we observe that the difference between the constant power and
the transmission power is significant. Thus, small variations on
the traffic do not affect the probabilities calculation. On the
other hand, as shown in Section IV-B3, the switching off prob-
abilities strongly depend on the roaming cost, thus affecting
the network energy efficiency (Fig. 6(b)). As also shown in
Fig. 5(c), the energy efficiency is reduced as the roaming cost
increases, while this impact is stronger for smaller number (N )
of operators. However, the relative difference of the energy
efficiency gain with respect to N increases for higher roaming
costs. For instance, for low traffic loads (α = 0.1), a network
of N = 6 operators achieves 36% higher energy efficiency
than a network of N = 4 operators, while this difference
is considerably increased to 174% in case of α = 1.0. This
occurs because, even though the switching off probabilities are
low for high roaming costs, the presence of more operators
leads to a higher probability of sharing the infrastructure.
Figure 7 illustrates the total network annual cost for different
traffic profiles (Fig. 7(a)), number of operators (Fig. 7(b)) and
roaming cost (Fig. 7(c)). The analytical expressions given in
Section V are again validated, while the results follow a very
similar behavior with the throughput and energy efficiency
only in the case of varying traffic profiles. On the other
hand, the annual cost decreases with higher number of MNOs
and decreasing roaming cost values. Given the switching off
probabilities, depicted in Table II, in networks with high
number of MNOs, the switching off probability increases,
leading to smaller number of active BSs, which contribute
to the total network cost according to Eq. (27). On the other
hand, with increasing roaming cost, the MNOs are unwilling
to switch off their BSs, resulting in higher aggregate cost.
C. Roaming Cost Analysis
The analysis and the experiments have revealed the crit-
icality of the roaming cost parameter in roaming-based in-
frastructure sharing schemes. Therefore, the selection of an
appropriate range of α for the performance evaluation of
our proposal becomes of paramount importance. To that end,
Fig. 8 presents the total network energy efficiency achieved
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Fig. 7. Total network annual cost validation for different (a) traffic profiles, (b) number of operators, and (c) roaming cost
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Fig. 8. Total network energy efficiency versus roaming cost to select the
appropriate α
by the proposal compared to four schemes for the whole
range of roaming cost values. We compare GTIS with the
baseline scenario (i.e., No Switch Off) and three state-of-
the-art approaches (i.e., R-to-1, E-bal and R-bal), which do
not depend on the roaming cost. As we already mentioned,
by employing the R-to-1, the MNO with heavier traffic load
concentrates the traffic of the whole network, giving the
opportunity to the rest of the MNOs to switch off their BSs. In
E-bal and R-bal, the MNOs switch off their BSs for different
portions of time in order to achieve equal energy gains and
roaming costs, respectively. As a result, the switching off time
of each MNO depends on their traffic load but is independent
of the specific value of the roaming cost. In Fig. 8, we observe
that GTIS outperforms R-bal independently of α, while there
is an interesting trade off with regard to the R-to-1 and E-
bal schemes. Our proposed solution achieves higher energy
efficiency for low values of α (i.e., α < 0.5 comparing to R-
to-1 and α < 0.78 comparing to E-bal). However, performance
drops as the roaming cost increases and, for high α, R-to-1
and E-bal achieve higher energy efficiency compared to GTIS
(i.e., α > 0.5, α > 0.78, respectively). When employing
GTIS, the MNOs do not have a strong incentive to switch
off their BSs for high roaming values. Since energy efficiency
is one of the key goals of the proposed scheme, we focus
on the values of α that ensure enhanced energy efficiency
performance with respect to the state-of-the-art schemes (i.e.,
α ∈ [0, 0.5]). Consequently, we have selected two indicative
values of α within this range (i.e., α = 0.1 and α = 0.5) for
the performance assessment of our proposed solution.
D. Performance evaluation
This section includes the performance results with regard to
various metrics, either telecommunication - oriented (network
throughput and energy efficiency) or cost - oriented (annual
cost and cost efficiency). In order to generalize the assessment
of our proposal, we consider different traffic volumes for the
network operators. In particular, we assume that MNO1 has
the maximum possible traffic load (i.e., ρ1 = 1), while the rest
MNOs have a common traffic volume ρ, which is a portion of
the maximum load (i.e., ρ2 = ... = ρN = ρ ∈ [0, 1]).
1) Telecommunication Metrics: Despite the importance of
estimating the absolute values of throughput in the system, the
deactivation of BSs potentially implies loss of connections.
To that end, we consider the normalized throughput, which is
an important GoS indicator that represents the percentage of
served connections in the system. Fig. 9 presents the normal-
ized throughput of the three infrastructure sharing schemes for
different number of MNOs. In Fig. 9(a) (N = 4), we can see
that all schemes guarantee the user service for variable traffic
load conditions (i.e., ρ < 0.8). However, as the traffic volume
grows, the R-bal, E-bal and R-to-1 approaches experience
small losses (around 2% 3% and 5%, respectively), which
still can be prohibitive for wireless cellular networks, while
the proposed GTIS approach is able to guarantee the service
of all the connections in the network. Hence, our scheme
can guarantee the service of all connections for the case of
N = 4 operators, which is highlighted as the most typical
scenario in recent studies [5]. For higher number of operators,
our proposal still outperforms the other three solutions and it
guarantees the proper service in the network for traffic volume
values up to ρ = 0.8 (case N = 5) and ρ = 0.7 (case
N = 6). The degraded performance of the R-to-1 scheme
is explained by the high number of deactivated BSs and
the traffic service by one MNO only, whereas our approach
proposes a distributed traffic roaming among the coexisting
MNOs. In addition, we observe that GTIS achieves different
performance with respect to the varying values of roaming
cost, thus justifying once again the importance of this variable.
For relatively small values of α (i.e., α = 0.1), there are less
active BSs and as a result the number of lost calls increases.
However, compared to the state-of-the-art schemes, the GTIS
supports higher traffic without losing any calls. For instance,
in the case of N = 6 MNOs and α = 0.5, the GTIS provides
full traffic service, while R-bal supports up to ρ = 0.6, E-bal
up to ρ = 0.5 and R-to-1 only up to ρ = 0.2.
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Fig. 9. Normalized throughput for (a) N=4, (b) N=5 and (c) N=6
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Fig. 10. Total network energy efficiency for different traffic profiles and
variable roaming costs and comparison to the state-of-the-art schemes
Fig. 10 presents the total network energy efficiency versus
ρ for two different values of α and N = 4 operators. We
observe that all schemes have the same behavior, since the
energy efficiency increases with the traffic load. An important
remark is that, for low roaming cost (α = 0.1), GTIS
significantly outperforms the baseline scenario (where no BS is
switched off), as well as the three state-of-the art algorithms.
However, for higher values of α, the energy efficiency gain
of GTIS compared to the R-to-1 scheme gradually decreases
and, eventually, the two schemes achieve similar performance
for α = 0.5. Even though the total network energy efficiency
performance is the same, it is interesting to study the individual
energy efficiency gains of the different MNOs. To that end,
the individual gains for the specific (but representative) case of
ρ = 0.1 and N = 4 are quantified in Table IV, where interest-
ing conclusions can be extracted. In particular, independently
of α, the R-to-1 scheme is beneficial only for the group of
operators that switch off their BSs, while the operator with
the active BSs faces important energy efficiency degradation.
More specifically, the active operator is subject to higher
energy consumption to serve the traffic of the whole network,
while the rest operators theoretically achieve infinite energy
efficiency, as they have their traffic served at zero energy cost.
The proposed GTIS eliminates this unfairness, by guaranteeing
energy efficiency gains to all operators, providing them with
extra incentives to switch off their BSs by participating in
the game. Comparing to the E-bal and R-bal that allow all
MNOs to switch off their BSs for different time periods, the
respective energy efficiency gains of the GTIS approach are
clearly higher due to the lower number of active BSs.
2) Cost Metrics: The total network annual cost and the
individual annual gains for the MNOs, having as a benchmark
the No Switch Off scheme, are presented in Figs. 11(a) and
11(b), respectively. We observe that the total annual cost is not
significantly affected by the traffic variations, since the fixed
cost for the network operation is much higher than the cost
due to the energy consumption in the network radio part. The
corresponding values are also shown in Table III. In addition,
for low roaming cost values (α = 0.1), GTIS achieves a
considerable reduction (around 86%) of the annual network
cost, mainly due to the deactivation of many underutilized BSs.
Regarding the individual revenue of each operator, plotted
in Fig. 11(b), we may observe that, similar to the energy
efficiency gains, the R-to-1 scheme provides financial gains
only to particular MNOs, and more particularly for the MNOs
that switch off their networks, whereas MNO1 has higher
expenses with respect to the No Switch Off scheme. On the
other hand, for GTIS, all operators are able to have higher
economic benefits compared to the E-bal and R-bal schemes,
independently of the particular roaming cost value. Further-
more, as α increases, the GTIS achieves higher financial gains
for the operators due to the increased roaming cost values.
Finally, Fig. 12 depicts the cost efficiency of the operators,
which is a metric that provides an indication for the relation
between the served traffic and the financial cost. In Fig. 12(a),
we illustrate the individual cost efficiency with respect to
different values of roaming cost. The traffic load in the network
(ρ) has a great impact on the cost efficiency, which, on the
other hand, is not significantly affected by the roaming cost (α)
values. The cost efficiency increases with the lower roaming
cost due to the reduced energy consumption. In addition, Fig.
12(b) presents the cost efficiency gains of the infrastructure
sharing schemes, having as benchmark the No Switch Off
scheme. The plot in Fig. 12(b) verifies our results so far, as it
highlights the great difference in the R-to-1 approach between
the active operator and the rest operators in the system. The
proposal of switching off the whole network of the MNO
with the lower traffic (R-to-1) results to great cost efficiency
for MNO2 −MNO4, who do not consume any energy and
are encumbered only with the compensation of the roaming
cost to the active operator. Contrariwise, MNO1 serves the
whole traffic of the network and consumes significant energy,
leading to an increased cost that is not compensated by the
received roaming. GTIS overcomes this issue by providing
cost efficiency gains to all operators, outperforming, at the
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TABLE IV
OPERATOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAIN/LOSS WITH RESPECT TO THE NO SWITCH OFF SCHEME FOR ρ = 0.1
α = 0.1 α = 0.5
Algorithm MNO1 MNO2 MNO3 MNO4 MNO1 MNO2 MNO3 MNO4
GTIS 93.2 27.1 27.1 27.1 94.2 45.3 45.3 45.3
R-to-1 -82.3 ∞ ∞ ∞ -82.3 ∞ ∞ ∞
E-bal 12.3 15.6 15.6 15.6 12.3 15.6 15.6 15.6
R-bal 11.9 13.2 13.2 13.3 11.9 13.2 13.2 13.2
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Fig. 11. (a) Total annual cost for different traffic profiles and variable roaming costs and (b) Revenue for each MNO under variable values of roaming cost
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Fig. 12. (a) Cost efficiency under different traffic profiles (b) Cost efficiency
gain/loss versus No Switch Off
same time, the E-bal and R-bal schemes.
E. Discussion
Based on the analysis in Section VI-D, we have shown that
the proposed GTIS outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches
in terms of throughput, energy efficiency and annual network
cost. In addition, it achieves balanced energy efficiency, cost
gains and cost efficiency results for all the MNOs. Further-
more, through an extensive assessment, we have identified the
significance of the roaming cost parameter, α. In particular,
higher values of α achieve higher throughput. On the other
hand, better performance results are attained in terms of energy
efficiency, aggregate network cost, individual cost gains and
cost efficiency, when lower values of α are chosen. Hence,
the MNOs should choose the suitable value of α depending
on their priorities. For example, if energy efficiency is not
priority, each MNO could achieve better individual throughput
performance by setting higher α. On the other hand, lower α
leads to great energy efficiency gains for the network, whereas
the individual performance of each operator is enhanced in
terms of energy and cost gains.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the low BSs utilization during
the night and the coexistence of multiple operators in the same
area, we proposed a novel infrastructure sharing algorithm
that encourages MNOs to share their resources and switch
off redundant BSs. By employing game theoretic tools and
realistic cost functions, we introduced a switching off scheme
that allows the MNOs to reduce their expenditures in multi-
operator cellular environments. The proposed scheme has been
evaluated in terms of throughput, energy and cost efficiency for
various traffic conditions and roaming cost values. The results
have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the
network energy efficiency, guaranteeing at the same time the
network throughput in realistic scenarios of up to four MNOs.
Regarding the financial costs/gains, the proposed scheme pro-
vides higher cost efficiency and fairness compared to the state-
of-the-art algorithms, motivating the operators to adopt game
theoretic strategies for their decisions. In our future work, we
plan to elaborate on cooperative game theoretic schemes in
order to investigate the potential trade offs.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Based on Definition 2, we want to calculate the strategy s∗i
that minimizes the expected cost of player i. Furthermore, due
to the game symmetry, all MNOs have identical switching off
probabilities, i.e., si,m = sj,m. By substituting these values in
Eq. (7), we can obtain the strategy s∗, thus deriving Eq. (8).
The roots of Eq. (8) correspond to the strategy of all players
that minimizes the individual cost of each player. According
to [26, Definition 3.4], a strategy profile s∗ = {s∗1 . . . s∗n} ∈ S
is the DSE if every element s∗i of s∗ is a dominant strategy
of player i. In our case, the solution s∗i of the game is:
E[Ci](s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≤ E[Ci](si, s∗−i)∀i ∈ N . (28)
Hence, we derive a common strategy profile for all op-
erators, i.e., s∗i = s
∗. Each element s∗ is the dominant
strategy for a given player, as it minimizes their expected
cost, irrespectively of the strategies of the other players.
Consequently, the solution, calculated in Eq. (8), is proven
to be a DSE in our game.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Given the symmetry of the game and by using the equality
si,m = sj,m = s
∗, we will show that, under specific conditions
and reasonable assumptions, the proposed game has a unique
mixed strategy DSE. Each operator has as an upper goal to
estimate its individual switching off probability that minimizes
its cost. To that end, we calculate the roots of the partial
derivative of the expected cost function with respect to s∗.
Thus, we get Eq. (29) at the top of next page.
According to the Heine-Borel Theorem [32], if the cost
function is concave (i.e., if its second derivative is always
positive and its first derivative has opposite sign in the
limits of the interval [0, 1]), there exists a unique solution
to our problem. The second derivative of the cost function
(Eq. (6)) with respect to s∗ is given by Eq. (30) (top of
the next page) and it is positive for the following realistic
values: i) N = {2, 3, . . . , 6}, ii) Cconst ∈ [465.1, 598.3]e,
iii) C(m)tr ∈ [4.8, 591.6]e, iv) C(i,0)inc ∈ [5.4, 613.1]e, and
v) C(m)roam = α ·
(
Cconst + C
(m)
tr
)
, with α ∈ [0, 1] . The first
derivative is an increasing function with a unique solution for
s∗ in the interval s∗ ∈ [0, 1].
APPENDIX C
In this appendix, we compare our non-cooperative approach
to a centralized solution. In Fig. 13, we show the DSE for
different number of MNOs, along with the global optimal
solution (Pareto optimal), that represents the solution with the
minimum expected cost. The DSE switching off probabilities
result in low cost values that are very close to the optimal ones.
In addition, it is worth noticing that the difference between
DSE and Pareto optimal points varies with the number of
MNOs. In particular, the presence of more MNOs leads to
higher differences, thus requiring the precise calculation of the
DSE in order to avoid higher costs. However, in most typical
scenarios in European countries where no more than N = 4
operators are involved [5], our proposed formulation estimates
accurate, close to optimal switching off probabilities.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Switching off probability
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 C
o
s
t 
(e
u
ro
s
)
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
*
** *
α=0.5
* DSE point
o Pareto Optimal point
Fig. 13. The DSE point and the global optimal solution
REFERENCES
[1] Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic
Forecast Update, 2013-2018, Feb. 2014.
[2] T. Chen, H. Zhang, Z. Zhao, and X. Chen, “Towards green wireless access
networks,” in 5th International ICST Conference on Communications and
Networking in China (CHINACOM), Aug. 2010.
[3] SBI Bulletin: Energy Efficiency Technologies in Information and Com-
munication Industry, 2005-2015, Aug. 2012.
[4] G. Fettweis and E. Zimmermann, “ICT Energy Consumption - Trends
and Challenges,” in 11th International Symposium on Wireless Personal
Multimedia Communications (WPMC), Sep. 2008.
[5] M. A. Marsan, and M. Meo, “Network sharing and its energy benefits:
a study of European mobile network operators,” IEEE Global Communi-
cations Conference, Exhibition & Industry Forum (GLOBECOM), 2013.
[6] T. Frisanco, P. Tafertshofer, P. Lurin, and R. Ang, “Infrastructure sharing
and shared operations for mobile network operators: From a deployment
and operations view,” in IEEE Network Operations and Management
Symposium (NOMS), Apr. 2008.
[7] GSMA, “Mobile Infrastructure Sharing,” in IEEE Network Operations
and Management Symposium (NOMS), Apr. 2008.
[8] D. E. Meddour, T. Rasheed, and Y. Gourhant, “On the role of infrastruc-
ture sharing for mobile network operators in emerging markets,” Elsevier
Computer Networks Journal, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 1567-1591, May 2011.
[9] Y. S. Soh, T. Q. S. Quek, M. Kountouris, and H. Shin, “Energy Efficient
Heterogeneous Cellular Networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31,
no. 5, pp. 840-850, May 2013.
[10] F. Richter, A. J. Fehske, and G. P. Fettweis, “Energy efficiency aspects
of base station deployment strategies in cellular networks,” in IEEE 70th
Vehicular Technology Conference Fall (VTC Fall), Sep. 2009.
[11] Y. Li, H. Celebi, M. Daneshmand, W. Chonggang, and Z. Weil-
iang, “Energy-efficient femtocell networks: challenges and opportunities,”
IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 99-105, Dec. 2013.
[12] Y. Tseng, and C. Huang, “Analysis of Femto Base Station Network
Deployment,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 748-757,
Feb. 2012.
[13] F. Han, Z. Safar, and K. J. R. Liu, “Energy-Efficient Base-Station
Cooperative Operation with Guaranteed QoS,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3505-3517, Aug. 2013.
[14] E. Oh, K. Son, and B. Krishnamachari, “Dynamic Base Station
Switching-On/Off Strategies for Green Cellular Networks,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 2126-2136, May 2013.
[15] G. P. Koudouridis and H. Li, “Distributed Power On-Off Optimisation
for Heterogeneous Networks - A comparison of autonomous and coop-
erative optimisation,” in IEEE 17th International Workshop on Computer
Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks
(CAMAD), Sep. 2012.
[16] A. Bousia, E. Kartsakli, L. Alonso, and C. Verikoukis, “Dynamic energy
efficient distance-aware base station switch on/off scheme for LTE-
Advanced,” in IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM),
Dec. 2012.
[17] A. Bousia, E. Kartsakli, L. Alonso, and C. Verikoukis, “Energy efficient
base station maximization switch off scheme for LTE-Advanced,” in IEEE
17th International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design
of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD), Sep. 2012.
[18] B. Leng, P. Mansourifard, and B. Krishnamachari, “Microeconomic
analysis of base-station sharing in green cellular networks,” in IEEE
International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM),
May 2014.
SUBMITTED PAPER 15
∂E[Ci,m]
∂s∗
= 0⇒ N · s∗N−1 · C(i,0)inc +
((
s∗ + s∗ · (N − 1) · (1− s∗)N−2
)
+
(
1− (1− s∗)N−1
))
· C(m)roam
+
[ N∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)(
N −N (m)ON
)
(1− s∗)N
(m)
ON s∗
N−N(m)
ON
−1
−
N∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
N
(m)
ON (1− s∗) s∗
N−N(m)
ON
]
·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
] (29)
∂E[Ci,m]
∂s∗ · ∂s∗ = 0⇒ N · (N − 1) · s
∗N−2 · C(i,0)inc + (1− s∗)N−3 · (N − 1) · (N − 2) · (1 + (N − 3) · s∗) · C(m)roam
+
N∑
N
(m)
ON =1
(
N − 1
N
(m)
ON − 1
)
· (1− s∗)N
(m)
ON −2 · s∗N−N
(m)
ON
−1 ·
[
s∗ ·N (m)ON ·
(
N
(m)
ON + 1
)
+
(
N −N (m)ON
)
·
(
N −N (m)ON − 1
)
· (1− s∗) ·
[
Cconst + C
(m)
tr +
(
C
(m)
tr − C(m)roam
)
· N −N
(m)
ON
N
(m)
ON
] (30)
[19] M. A. Marsan and M. Meo, “Energy Efficient Management of two
Cellular Access Networks,” in ACM GreenMetrics, Jun. 2009.
[20] M. A. Marsan, and M. Meo, “Energy efficient wireless Internet access
with cooperative cellular networks,” Elsevier Computer Networks Journal,
vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 386398, Feb. 2011.
[21] E. Oh, B. Krishnamachari, X. Liu, and Z. Niu, “Towards dynamic
energy-efficient operation of cellular network infrastructure,” IEEE Com-
mun. Mag., vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 5661, Jun. 2011.
[22] A. Bousia, E. Kartsakli, A. Antonopoulos, L. Alonso, and C. Verikoukis,
“Game Theoretic Approach for Switching Off Base Stations in Multi-
Operator Environments,” in IEEE International Conference on Commu-
nications (ICC), Jun. 2013.
[23] 3GPP TR 32.826, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Spec-
ification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication man-
agement; Study on Energy Savings Management (ESM) (Release 10),
Technical Report, V10.0.0 (2010-03).
[24] UMTS Forum, Mobile traffic forecasts 2010-2020 report, Jan. 2011.
[25] D. Fudenberg, and J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.
[26] Z. Han, D. Niyato, W. Saad, T. Basar, and A. Hjorungnes, Game
Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks, 1st Edition, Cambridge
university press, 2012.
[27] Y. Xu, J. Wang, Q. Wu, A. Anpalagan, and Y. Yao, “Opportunistic
Spectrum Access in Unknown Dynamic Environment: A Game-Theoretic
Stochastic Learning Solution”, IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11,
no. 4, pp. 1380-1391, Apr. 2012.
[28] Y. Xing, and R. Chandramouli, “Stochastic Learning Solution for
Distributed Discrete Power Control Game in Wireless Data Networks”,
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 932-944, Aug. 2008.
[29] L. Liang, and G. Feng, “A Game-Theoretic Framework for Interference
Coordination in OFDMA Relay Networks”, IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.,
vol. 61, no. 1, pp.321-332, Jan. 2012.
[30] G. Auer, V. Giannini, C. Desset, I. Godor, P. Skillermark, M. Olsson, M.
A. Imran, D. Sabella, M. J. Gonzalez, O. Blume, and A. Fehske, “How
much energy is needed to run a wireless network?,” in IEEE Wireless
Commun., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 40-49, Oct. 2011.
[31] S. Tombaz, A. Vastberg, and J. Zander, “Energy- and cost-efficient ultra-
high-capacity wireless access,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 18, no. 5,
pp. 1824, Oct. 2011.
[32] W. Rudin, Principles of Mathematical Analysis. 2nd Edition, New York:
MacGraw-Hill, 1964.
Alexandra Bousia received her B.S. and M.S. de-
grees from the Department of Computer & Com. En-
gineering, Univ. of Thessaly, in 2008 and 2009, re-
spectively. She is currently a Marie Curie researcher
toward the Ph.D. degree in wireless communications
at the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC).
Since 2011 she has been involved in several national
and European projects. She received the best paper
award at IEEE GLOBECOM 2014. Her research
interests include wireless networks, MAC protocols,
energy efficient protocols, and RRM algorithms.
Elli Kartsakli received her Ph.D. in Wireless Tele-
com. from the Technical Univ. of Catalonia (UPC) in
2012. She holds a degree in Electrical and Computer
Engineering from the National Technical Univ. of
Athens, Greece (2003) and an M.Sc. in Mobile and
Satellite Com. from the Univ.of Surrey, UK (2004).
She is currently a Post-Doctoral Researcher in UPC
and has participated in several national and European
projects (GREENET, WSN4QoL, etc.). Her primary
research interests include wireless networking, chan-
nel access protocols and energy efficient protocols.
Angelos Antonopoulos received the Ph.D. degree
from the Technical Univ. of Catalonia (UPC) in
2012. He is an author of more than 50 research
papers on various topics, including cooperative com-
munications, network coding and energy efficient
network planning. He has participated in several Eu-
ropean projects and has been awarded by the Tech-
nical Chamber of Greece for Exceptional Graduate
Performance. He received the Best Paper Award at
IEEE GLOBECOM 2014 and the Best Demo Award
at IEEE CAMAD 2014, while, in January 2015, he
was nominated as Exemplary Reviewer for the IEEE Communications Letters.
Luis Alonso received the Ph.D. from UPC
(Barcelona) in 2001 and got a permanent position at
UPC becoming an Associate Professor in 2006. Co-
founder of the Wireless Communications and Tech-
nologies Research Group (WiComTec), to which
currently belongs. His current research interests are
within the field of medium access protocols, cross-
layer optimization, cooperative transmissions, cogni-
tive radio and QoS for all kind of wireless networks.
He is author of forty research papers, one book,
twelve book chapters and more than one hundred
papers in international congresses and received several best paper awards.
Christos Verikoukis received the Ph.D. degree from
the Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona,
Spain, in 2000. He is currently a Senior Researcher
and the Head of the SMARTECH Department with
the Telecommunications Technology Centre of Cat-
alonia, Spain, and an Adjunct Associate Professor
with the University of Barcelona. He has supervised
15 Ph.D. students and five postdoctoral researchers
since 2004. He has participated in more than 30
competitive projects while serving as the Principal
Investigator in national projects in Greece and Spain,
as well as the Technical Manager for Marie Curie and Celtic projects.
